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Comment
Fade to Black: El-Masri v. United States
Validates the Use of the State Secrets
Privilege to Dismiss "Extraordinary
Rendition" Claims
CPT Daniel J. Huyck*
In the words of Justice Jackson, "comprehensive and
undefined presidential powers hold both practical advantages
and grave dangers for the country . . . [especially] in a time of
transition and public anxiety."' Judge King of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently dismissed El-Masri v.
United States (El-Masri I1)2 based on one such undefined
presidential power: the state secrets privilege.' The state
* J.D. Candidate 2009, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S., Northern
Michigan University, and Captain in the Minnesota Army National Guard. The
positions and opinions in this article are those of the author and do not represent the
views of the United States Government, the Department of Defense, the United
States Army, or the government of the great state of Minnesota. To all those at
MJIL who provided expert advice and assistance, thank you for your hard work and
dedication-any errors are mine and mine alone. Thank you is also owed to my
wonderful wife and family (who will likely never read past this point). Finally, I
dedicate this article to my unborn daughter who is due to arrive June 2008.
1. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952)
(addressing the duty of a president during the times of national trials, specifically
the Korean War).
2. 479 F.3d 296, 313 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 75 U.S.L.W. 3663, 76
U.S.L.W. 3021 (U.S. Oct. 9, 2007) (No. 06-1613). El-Masri's initial claim alleged that
"George Tenet, three corporate defendants, ten unnamed employees of the Central
Intelligence Agency (the 'CIA'), and ten unnamed employees of the defendant
corporations . . . were involved in a CIA operation in which he was [unlawfully]
detained and interrogated in violation of his rights under the Constitution and
international law." Id. at 299.
3. The U.S. government claimed that an adequate defense would pose "an
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secrets privilege is integral to the Justice Department's
response to post-9/11 counterterrorism litigation.4 But where
the government illegally or mistakenly asserts its authority
against an innocent individual, the state secrets privilege
effectively bars restitution for that individual-such as in a case
of mistaken identity.' El-Masri II raised important questions
concerning the limits of unchecked executive privilege' and an
individual's right to judicial redress.7
When establishing or validating privileges, certain
individual interests must be compromised to strike an
acceptable balance of all interests The government's
expanding and unchecked use of the state secrets privilege
strikes a potentially dangerous balance between protecting
legitimate government secrets and the right to judicial redress
of wrongs.9 El-Masri H presented the U.S. Supreme Court with
an opportunity to further define the substance and limits of the
state secrets privilege and address its expanded use during the
Global War on Terror. While the Court may have passed in
unreasonable risk that privileged state secrets would be disclosed." Id. at 299-300.
4. Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security
Regulation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1249 (2007).
5. El-Masri claimed that he was detained in violation of his constitutional
rights. El-Masri II, 479 F.3d at 299. The claim was dismissed because the court
found that the "entire aim of the suit [was] to prove the existence of state secrets."
El-Masri v. Tenet (El-Masri 1), 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 539 (E.D. Va. 2006).
6. The judiciary's "de facto surrender" to the executive of the ability to assert
unilaterally the state secrets claim has "denude[d] courts of their constitutional
responsibilit[y]" of ensuring that the branches are operating within their
constitutional limits. ROBERT M. PALLITTO & WILLIAM G. WEAVER, PRESIDENTIAL
SECRECY AND THE LAw 88 (2007).
7. When applying the state secrets privilege, the court balances an
individual's private interests in vindicating his or her claim against "the national
interest in preserving state secrets." El-Masri I, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 539.
8. Privileges are not intended to reinforce the factfinding process; instead,
they impede the search for truth by excluding information that may be highly
probative. 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 5:2 (3d ed. 2007).
9. See PALLITTO & WEAVER, supra note 6, at 86-87 (discussing how the
privilege has been mishandled by the judiciary and how the privilege has trumped
even constitutional claims); see also Aziz Huq, Dangerous Discretion: State Secrets
and the El-Masri Rendition Case, JURIST, Mar. 12, 2007,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/03/dangerous-discretion-state-secrets-and.php
[hereinafter Huq, Dangerous Discretion] (arguing that the state secrets privilege has
"dangerous and unwarranted breadth"); Henry Lanman, Secret Guarding, SLATE,
May 22, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2142155 (stating that the government has
begun to use the privilege to dismiss claims of criminal conduct, creating broad
unchecked executive power).
10. Posting of Ben Winograd to SCOTUSblog, http://scotusblog.com/wp/term-
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this instance,' these issues will not simply fade away.12
Eventually either the Court or the U.S. Congress will have to
address the executive's increasingly aggressive use of the state
secrets privilege.'3
El-Masri exemplifies the United States' expanding use of
the state secrets doctrine, and its high potential for misuse. The
dismissal of El-Masri during the initial stages of the claim
stands in stark contrast to the checks and balances utilized by
other nations to prevent the misuse of the privilege. This
Comment explores the development of the state secrets doctrine
from its common law roots through its recognition by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1954. This Comment examines the
development of-and differences between-the Totten'4 doctrine
and the state secrets privilege, and how El-Masri IF2 effectively
merges the two. Finally, this Comment contrasts how the
Canadian government successfully adjudicated a claim similar
to El-Masri and examines international methods of determining
and adjudicating state secrets. This Comment concludes with a
tracker/petitions-to-watch-conference-of-10507 (Oct. 1, 2007, 4:06). By denying
certiorari the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to clarify potential discrepancies on
how the privilege is applied within the different federal circuits. Id.; see also
PALLITTO & WEAVER, supra note 6, at 93 (discussing the urge to grant the executive
branch deference during times of national emergency). The U.S. Supreme Court's
next opportunity to clarify the state secrets privilege is within American Civil
Liberties Union v. National Security Agency, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. July 6, 2007),
which has just been docketed as No. 07-468. Posting of Lyle Denniston to
SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/court-grants-no-new-
cases-2 (Oct. 9, 2007, 10:04).
11. This may have been a "defensive denial" because the Court would prefer to
confront the state secrets doctrine "in a less fraught context," such as a commercial
or employment case. Aziz Huq, Supreme Court El-Masri Rejection Undermines
Accountability for Renditions, JURIST, Oct. 12, 2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu
hotline/2007/10/supreme-court-renders-further-blow-to.php [hereinafter Huq,
Rendition Accountability]. The theory is that "at least four Justices, who favor broad
conceptions of executive power .. .likely thought the case was correctly decided[,]"
while four others "thought that pushing for a grant of certiorari would be unwise
because of the risk of an adverse judgment." Id.
12. A Google search for "state secrets privilege" conducted on January 15, 2008
returned over 70,000 hits.
13. See TED GuP, NATION OF SECRETS: THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY AND THE
AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE 53 (2007) (describing how one of the staunchest supporters
of presidential secrecy rebuked the President for hiding information from the House
Intelligence Committee); see also Huq, Dangerous Discretion, supra note 9
(concluding that Congress is better positioned than the courts to check executive
claims of secrecy).
14. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
15. 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 75 U.S.L.W. 3663, 76 U.S.L.W.
3021 (U.S. Oct. 9, 2007) (No. 06-1613).
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recommendation for stricter judicial scrutiny of invocations of
the state secrets privilege and the establishment of a legislative
committee to determine the limits of the executive branch's
ability to assert state secrets privilege. The legislative
committee would also serve an appellate function for claims.
I. BACKGROUND
The source of the state secrets privilege has been attributed
to Article I of the U.S. Constitution, 6 separation of powers,
executive privilege, and other sources. 7 Regardless of its origin,
the nature and scope of the privilege are not well defined." The
question of whether the state secrets privilege is a common law
evidentiary rule or a constitutional rule derived from separation
of powers is of great importance. 9 If the privilege is based on
the separation of powers, the legislature and judiciary may only
possess limited ability to "alter or override" the privilege's
impact on litigation." If the privilege is evidentiary, however,
the legislature and judiciary have much more freedom to
override executive claims to the privilege.2'
This Comment relies on a thorough understanding of the
origin of the state secrets privilege and the Totten doctrine as
they relate to the public's ability to access information for
adjudication of government wrongs. Following an in-depth
look at the origins of both the state secrets privilege and Totten
doctrine, this Comment moves on to explore the U.S.
Government's development and increased utilization of the state
secrets privilege to dismiss claims concerning extraordinary
rendition.
16. Id. at 304 (citing Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988)).
17. DAVID BANISAR, GOVERNMENT SECRECY: DECISIONS WITHOUT DEMOCRACY
17 (2007), available at http://www.openthegovernment.org/otg/govtsecrecy.pdf
(citation omitted).
18. Chesney, supra note 4, at 1270.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. "Without information, the people have no power to make choices about
their government-no ability to meaningfully participate in the decision-making
process, to hold their governments accountable, to thwart corruption, to reduce
poverty, or, ultimately, to live in a genuine democracy." ARTICLE 19, ACCESS TO
INFORMATION: AN INSTRUMENTAL RIGHT FOR EMPOWERMENT 9 (2007), available at
http://www.article 19.org/pdfs/publications/ati-empowerment-right.pdf.
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A. THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE AND THE TOTTEN DOCTRINE
'A ranking of the various privileges recognized in our courts
would be a delicate undertaking at best, but it is quite clear that
the privilege to protect state secrets must head the list."23
The state secrets privilege can trace its roots to the crown
privilege that developed in England and Scotland. Even
though the U.S. Supreme Court did not officially recognize the
common law state secrets25 privilege until 1953,26 the privilege's
root in America is actually much older.27 Despite the privilege's
apparent age, there is little jurisprudence defining its scope or
impact, especially when compared with other existing executive
23. Halkin v. Helms (Halkin 1), 598 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The Halkin I
court held that the state secrets privilege is absolute, and if disclosures in camera
are inconsistent with the normal rights of a party to inquiry and cross-examination
then the interest of the individual litigant must give way to the government's
privilege against disclosure. Id. (citing Heine v. Raus, 399 F.2d 785, 791 (4th Cir.
1968)).
24. PALLITTO & WEAVER, supra note 6, at 101. The executive privilege also
derives from the crown privilege; however, in the United States the executive
privilege is different in that it is a qualified privilege meant to protect executive
communication between the President and his advisors from partisan members of
Congress and is not necessarily connected to national security. Id. at 93.
25. "A 'secret of state' is a governmental secret relating to the national defense
or the international relations of the United States." 1 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 509 (4th ed. 1996).
"Official information" is information within the custody or control of a
department or agency of the government the disclosure of which is shown
to be contrary to the public interest and which consists of: (A)
intragovernmental opinions or recommendations submitted for
considerati3n in the performance of decisional or policymaking functions, or
(B) . . . investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes and not
otherwise available, or (C) information within the custody or control of a
governmental department or agency whether initiated within the
department or agency or acquired by it in its exercise of its official
responsibilities and not otherwise available to the public[.]
Id.
26. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
27. Four years after Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), Chief
Justice John Marshall revisited the issue of confidential government information
during Aaron Burr's trial for treason. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D.
Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d). Marshall, sitting as Circuit Justice, upheld Burr's right to
subpoena correspondence between President Jefferson and General Wilkinson, while
stipulating that the court would withhold any irrelevant information that "would
endanger the public safety" if disclosed. Id. at 37. In Burr, Marshall held that when
the information is required for the defense of a party the court would "very
reluctantly deny" such a request. Id.
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privileges."
1. The Totten Doctrine: Secret Contracts Are Non-Actionable
The government first claimed the state secret privilege in
Totten v. United States.29 The U.S. Supreme Court determined
that an action cannot be maintained when that action would
result in the disclosure of a secret contract for clandestine
services to the government.3" The Court found that "[t]he
service stipulated by the contract was a secret service" and that
both "employer and agent must have understood that the lips of
the other were to be for ever [sic] sealed respecting the relation
of either to the matter."3 ' Because it was a breach of the
contract to even initiate the claim, the action could not be
maintained.32 This was not a direct holding on state secrets
privilege; rather it established a recognized contractual
privilege between the government and another willing party to a
contract for secret services.33 The application of the Totten
doctrine requires a party to voluntarily enter into a secret
contract with the U.S. Government, where each party's lips
remain forever sealed concerning that contract.34
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Totten in Tenet v. Doe.35
28. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7.
29. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875). William A. Lloyd entered into
a contract with President Lincoln to infiltrate the insurrection states and report
back information allegedly for $200 per month plus expenses. Id. at 105-06. After
the war Lloyd brought suit for breach of contract after he was reimbursed for
expenses only. Id. at 106.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 107.
33. See id.; see also United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 n.26 (1953)
(characterizing Totten as a case where "the very subject matter of the action .. was
a matter of state secret").
34. See Totten, 92 U.S. at 106.
35. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 3 (2005). Tenet involved an alleged secret
agreement between the CIA and two foreign intelligence agents. Id. The agents
claim that the CIA "reneged on its agreement to provide lifetime financial support."
John Harrington et al., National Security, 40 INT'L LAW. 487, 489 (2006). "The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the complaint was not governed by
Totten and need not be dismissed. The Supreme Court reversed that decision and
found that Totten squarely governed the suit, affirming the continued validity of the
Totten rule." Id. (internal citations omitted). The Totten line of cases provide an
absolute bar to any kind of judicial review when there is a secret espionage
relationship between the plaintiff and the government. Id. (internal citation
omitted). In such a case the state secrets privilege does not provide the absolute
protection necessary in any action which would lead to the disclosure of matters the
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Tenet expanded Totten to all clandestine spy relationships and
not simply breach of secret contract claims.36 The Court went on
to distinguish the Totten doctrine from the state secrets
privilege.37  The Court emphasized that the state secrets
privilege is evidentiary in nature and when upheld prevents
only the disclosure of classified material that may foreclose a
claim, where the Totten doctrine, when successful, will fully bar
the claim from proceeding.38
2. The U.S. Supreme Court Recognizes the State Secrets Privilege
Marbury v. Madison39 provided the first "glimmer" of the
state secrets privilege in American law.' Marbury sought to
elicit testimony from Attorney General Levi Lincoln concerning
whether the commissions at issue in the case had been found in
the Secretary of State's office." Mr. Lincoln refused, claiming
that he was privileged from testifying "as to any facts which
came officially to his knowledge" while acting in his capacity as
secretary of state.4" The Court, siding with Marbury, reasoned
that nothing confidential was in the information requested but
suggested that Mr. Lincoln would not have to disclose the
information if it were disclosed to him "in confidence. 43
In 1953 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the substantive
issue of the state secrets privilege for the first time in United
States v. Reynolds.' In 1948 an Air Force plane was involved in
a fatal crash while on a mission testing secret electronics
equipment.45 The widows of those killed brought suit under the
Tort Claims Act and in the pre-trial stages motioned under Rule
34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for production of the
Air Force accident report.' The Government refused to produce
law itself regards as confidential-such as allowing the secret agents' relationship
with the government to be revealed. Tenet, 544 U.S. at 10-11.
36. Harrington et al., supra note 35, at 489.
37. Tenet, 544 U.S. at 10 (stating that Totten cannot be "reduced to an example
of the state secrets privilege").
38. Harrington et al., supra note 35, at 489-90.
39. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
40. Chesney, supra note 4, at 1271.
41. Id. at 1271-72.
42. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 143.
43. Id. at 144.
44. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
45. Id. at 2-3.
46. Id. at 3.
2008]
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the report, claiming that the information was privileged.47 The
district court ordered the Air Force to allow the court to review
the documents in camera to determine whether they contained
privileged matter.4" After the government refused to honor the
order, the court entered judgment in the widows' favor. 9 After
granting certiorari and finding that a state secrets privilege was
valid, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that Rule 34 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permitted the government to
refuse production of privileged information." In establishing
the state secrets privilege, the Court relied on the English
precedent outlined in Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co." The
House of Lords, in considering the function of the court when
dealing with the state secrets privilege, held that the court must
treat the decision of the non-judicial official as "conclusive."52
They further held that it is not proper for a judge to inspect the
documentation to determine if the public interest requires its
exclusion, but rather that the privilege must be asserted in such
a manner as to satisfy the judge that the proper executive
department head has seen and reviewed the information. 3
Some claim that the holding in Duncan is incorrect, however,
and that it is a misstatement of Scottish law. 4  In fact,
concerning the question of the discovery of documents the House
of Lords unanimously overruled Duncan in the unanimous 1968
47. Id. at 3-4. The Secretary of the Air Force sent a letter to the district court
stating that it would not be in the public interest to furnish the report and filed a
formal Claim of Privilege. Id. at 4.
48. Id. at 5.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 6.
51. Id. at 7 n.15. Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624, is often
cited as the primary modern common law case on the issue of crown privilege.
PALLITTO & WEAVER, supra note 6, at 102.
52. EDMUND M. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE
127 (Jack B. Weinstein ed., 5th ed. 1976). What the Reynolds Court failed to
consider, however, is that the English privilege grew out of royal prerogatives which
were claimed by the crown to be beyond the reach of law; and the crown, as the
"fountain of justice" purported to always act in the public interest. E.g., WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *266, *270. In such a situation the crown was
acting as both the judiciary and executive: as Queen Elizabeth I told Parliament,
"[you] should do well to meddle with no matters of State, but such as should be
propounded unto them, and to occupy themselves in other matters, concerning the
Common-Wealth." H.L. JOUR. (Apr. 1571), available at http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=43682.
53. MORGAN, supra note 52, at 127.
54. See PALLITTO & WEAVER, supra note 6, at 102 (citing several English and
Scottish cases wherein the court overrode the Crown's assertion of privilege on the
grounds of public interest).
THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE
Conway decision."
The Reynolds Court cited Wigmore's treatise on evidence,
which acknowledged that there must be a privilege for secrets of
State (i.e., matters the disclosure of which would endanger the
nation's governmental requirements or its relations of
friendship and profit with other nations). 6  But Wigmore
cautioned that such a privilege is often improperly invoked and
loosely applied and therefore requires a strict definition of its
legitimate limitations. 7 Reynolds attempted to define such
limitations by focusing the privilege to the head of an executive
agency within the government and by allowing the courts to
balance the necessity of the evidence against the claim of
privilege.58
The Reynolds decision was the U.S. Supreme Court's
attempt to establish the elements of the common law state
secrets doctrine. 9 The Court determined that the privilege: 1)
belongs to the government and must be asserted by the
government;' 2) must be a formal claim lodged by the head of
the controlling department after personal consideration by such
55. Conway v. Rimmer, [1968] 1 All E.R. 874 (H.L.) (U.K.). Lord Hodson stated
that "in some classes of documents, such as those concerned with claims for
negligence against the Crown, privilege should in future not be claimed." Id. at 902;
see also GARY SLAPPER & DAVID KELLY, PRINCIPLES OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM
36 (3d ed. 1997).
56. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 nn.11 & 13 (1953). In his treatise
on evidence, Wigmore recognized that the state secrets privilege exists but
determined that in the United States, it is the courts and not the executive that
determine the validity of the claim; and that a court which abdicates the function of
determining admissibility will "furnish the bureaucratic officials too ample
opportunities for abusing the privilege." 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2379 (John T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961).
57. Id. Wigmore found the state secrets privilege to be so abstract that he was
forced to divide it into eight categories of exemptions; but concerning the duty to
give evidence, Wigmore was clear that there was no exemption for the universal
testimonial duty to give evidence in judicial investigations. Louis Fisher, State Your
Secrets, LEGAL TIMES, June 26, 2006, at 68.
58. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 ("Where there is a strong showing of necessity, the
claim of privilege should not be lightly accepted."). Conversely, if the necessity of
the evidence has been reduced by an available alternative the Court may avert a
showdown with the privilege and allow a claim to continue. Id.
59. Ironically, the "secret" protected by the privilege in Reynolds was revealed
when the Air Force declassified the documents in 2000. The declassified documents
were filled with evidence of negligence by the Air Force, and their straightforward
conclusion that the aircraft was not considered safe for flight. Lanman, supra note
9. Although not directly considering the doctrine, recent Supreme Court dicta
recently reaffirmed Reynolds. See Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 9 (2005).
60. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7.
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person;6' 3) there must be a judicial balancing of necessity of the
evidence including any potential alternative evidence available
against the invocation of the privilege; 2 and 4) a successful
claim by the government does not require the complete
dismissal of the entire complaint. 3 An essential element of
Reynolds is that a complaint should not be dismissed where the
necessity for the privileged evidence has been "minimized by an
available alternative, which might have given respondents the
evidence to make out their case without forcing a showdown...
[with the] privilege. '
Several of the elements established in Reynolds have been
clarified since the 1953 decision. Clarifications include: the
court will attempt to permit discovery through a narrow review
of the privilege;65 the privilege is merely an evidentiary
privilege;66 the privilege is reviewed on a fact-specific, case-by-
case basis;67 the privilege extends to military secrets, state
secrets, foreign affairs, intelligence sources, informant
identities, and information gathering methods;" constitutional
61. Id. at 7-8.
62. Id. at 11.
63. See id. In 1958 the Second Circuit held that as long as measures are taken
to protect national security during trial the evidence should not be withheld.
Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1958). Also, where a party
does not require production of any material he does not already possess then
conducting the entire trial in camera satisfies the government's concern. Id. at 44.
64. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 (emphasis added). In 1967 the Nevada Supreme
Court held that the state secrets privilege did not apply where the secret details at
issue were published in several national newspapers and magazines. Elson v.
Bowen, 436 P.2d 12, 14-15 (Nev. 1967). Elson suggested two limitations to the state
secrets privilege: 1) "the privilege loses force once the information" purported to be
secret is available to the public; and 2) the privilege may not be invoked by the
government to defend unconstitutional conduct. Chesney, supra note 4, at 1291.
65. See Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998); Kinoy v.
Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 1, 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 709-10 (1974)).
66. See Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1165 (noting the state secrets privilege is a common
law evidentiary privilege); Halkin v. Helms (Halkin 11), 690 F.2d 977, 995-96 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (holding that the state secrets privilege fundamentally differs from
decision to claim a [Freedom of Information Act national defense] exemption because
the state secrets privilege is a decision of policy made at the highest level of the
executive branch after consideration of the particular case); Spock v. United States,
464 F. Supp. 510, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (noting that the "state secrets privilege is only
an evidentiary privilege"); Kinoy, 67 F.R.D. at 14 (noting evidentiary privileges are
narrowly construed).
67. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 (holding that in each case the government will
have to show necessity to invoke the privilege).
68. Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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claims do not bar the privilege;69 and the privilege may be
asserted through unclassified, open affidavits alone or in
conjunction with classified affidavits in camera and ex parte. °
When reviewing the executive's state secrets claim, the judiciary
must keep in mind the executive's intent and that "his official
habit and leaning tend to sway him toward a minimizing of the
interest of the individual."7
A. STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE USED TO DISMISS EXTRAORDINARY
RENDITION CLAIMS
"In legal and administrative proceedings where the
Government makes [state secret] claims over some information,
the single most important factor in trying to ensure public
accountability and fairness is for the Government to limit, from
the outset, the breadth of those claims to what is truly
necessary. " 2
1. Development of Extraordinary Rendition
The U.S. concept of rendition can be traced to founding
documents;" however, the CIA's modern iteration of the
69. See In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
70. See id. at 59-64; El-Masri v. United States (El-Masri 11), 479 F.3d 296,
305-06 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 75 U.S.L.W. 3663, 76 U.S.L.W. 3021 (U.S. Oct.
9, 2007) (No. 06-1613). It is generally up to the court to determine the extent it will
examine or require additional affidavits beyond those which are unclassified.
Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 58-59 & n.37 (citations omitted). The government need only
show a reasonable danger that harm would result from the release of the
information. Id. at 58 (citing Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10). However, the "mosaic
theory" maintains that no information is truly harmless because even innocuous-
seeming information may fit into a larger puzzle that could provide clues to the
enemies of the United States. Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166; Francisco Ferreiro,
Overprivileged, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Mar.-Apr. 2006, at 24, 24. If the seemingly
innocuous evidence, when taken together, becomes a classified mosaic "the state
secret may be invoked to bar its disclosure and the court cannot order the
government to disentangle this [ordinary] information from other classified
information." Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166.
71. Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 58 (citation omitted). There is a recognized incentive
for an agency to claim the privilege in order to avoid embarrassment, enhance
political objectives, and prevent criminal investigation. PALLITTO & WEAVER, supra
note 6, at 90.
72. COMM'N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CAN. OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO
MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 304 (2006) [hereinafter Arar Commission], available at
http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/AREnglish.pdf.
73. The Extradition Clause of the U.S. Constitution allows fugitives to be
extradited to the states from which they fled by demand of executive authorities of
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program began in 1995."4 The program initially had two explicit
goals: 1) incarcerate those who planned or executed attacks on
the United States or its allies; and 2) seize documents that were
on the person when arrested.75  President Clinton strictly
limited the program to only those individuals on whom
outstanding legal process existed.76 On September 18, 2001, a
joint session of Congress passed the Authorization for Use of
Military Force (AUMF)." The President exercised the powers
granted via the AUMF to fundamentally alter and expand the
CIA's rendition program to include enemy combatants78 and
suspects for questioning. 9
that state. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. The Fugitive Slave Clause required the
rendering of slaves who escaped from their owners. Id. cl. 3.
74. Extraordinary Rendition in U.S. Counterterrorism Policy: The Impact on
Transatlantic Relations: J. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International
Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight and the Subcomm. on Europe of the
Comm. on Foreign Affairs H.R., 110th Cong. 15 (2007) [hereinafter Rendition
Hearings] (statement of Michael F. Scheuer, Former Chief, Bin Laden Unit, CIA),
available at http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov. Mr. Scheuer states that the
program was started not as a method of interrogation, but rather as a tool to attack
and dismantle Al-Qaeda. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. Even though some of the countries to which the captured individuals
were delivered were identified as human rights abusers, the CIA received a
guarantee that each country would "treat the person according to its own laws." Id.
Extradition of this sort is in direct contradiction to the Valentine decision, which
held that "the power to provide for extradition ... is not confided to the Executive in
the absence of treaty or legislative provision." Valentine v. United States ex rel.
Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 8 (1936). In the absence of legislative provision, there is no
authority vested in any department of the government to seize a fugitive criminal for
transfer to a foreign nation. Id. at 9 (citing 1 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, MOORE ON
EXTRADITION 21 (1891)).
77. "[Use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons."
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(emphases added).
78. Enemy combatants are different than prisoners of war in that they are not
entitled to protections afforded by the Geneva Convention concerning incarceration,
treatment, and adjudication. See U.S. MILITARY, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR DETAINEE
OPERATIONS, Joint Publ'n 3-63, 1-9-11 (Mar. 23, 2005) (Final Coordination Draft),
available at http:/fhrw.org/campaigns/torture/jointdoctrine/ointdoctrineO4O7O5.pdf.
On June 29, 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Geneva Conventions do not
apply to enemy combatants. Hamdan v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2757 (2006).
79. See Rendition Hearings, supra note 74, at 15 (statement of Michael F.
Scheuer, Former Chief, Bin Laden Unit, CIA). U.S. officials have acknowledged
between 100 and 150 individuals have been seized and flown to either their home
country or to another country. Gary Williams, Indefinite Detention and
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Such an expansion of Presidential authority is not
uncommon during times of crisis, and the Executive has often
been granted great deference when operating within his
Commander in Chief powers." Additionally, it is commonly
understood that the President acts with the maximum authority
of his office when under the AUMF he targets those individuals
who participated in Al-Qaeda 1 both before and after 9/11.82
2. Arar v. Ashcroft 3
The first widely publicized rendition involves Maher Arar.'
Arar is a dual-citizen of Canada and Syria who resides in
Canada. 5 On September 26, 2002, he flew from Tunisia to
Montreal with a layover in New York. 6 While in New York,
airport officials detained and questioned him for about eight
hours. 7 He was then transported to another site at the airport
where he was placed in solitary confinement in shackles
overnight. The following day two FBI agents interrogated Arar
for about five hours, and they repeatedly ignored his requests to
make a phone call and see counsel. Later that day Arar was
Extraordinary Rendition, 19 L.A. LAW. 44, 47 (2006).
80. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944) (holding that
the order to relocate and inter persons of Japanese descent without probable cause
was an acceptable use of military power during times of war); see also PETER M.
SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 672-73 (1988)
(discussing President Lincoln's reaction to and defiance of Ex parte Merryman, 17 F.
Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487)). But cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582-83, 588-89 (1952) (refusing to nationalize the striking
steel mills during the Korean military action under the President's Commander-in-
Chief power).
81. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9-11
COMMISSION REPORT 326, 332 (2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/91 1/
report/911Report.pdf (declaring Al-Qaeda responsible for the 9/11 attacks and citing
the resolve of the United States to punish those responsible).
82. "When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization
of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in
his own right plus all that Congress can delegate." Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343
U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). In the capture of Al-Qaeda suspects the
President acts pursuant to the Congressional Authorization for Use of Military
Force and his own Commander-in-Chief powers; therefore he "personif[ies] the
federal sovereignty" of the United States. See id. at 636.
83. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
84. See Williams, supra note 79, at 47-48.
85. Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 252.
86. Id. at 252-53.
87. Id. at 253.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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given an opportunity to voluntarily return to Syria but refused,
citing fear of torture and instead requested a return to Canada
or Switzerland?°
For the next three days Arar was detained at the
Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York." On
October 1, 2002, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
initiated removal proceedings alleging Arar was a member of Al-
Qaeda.92 On October 8, 2002, Arar was deported to Syria where
he was detained for ten months.93 Arar alleges that he was
placed in a "grave" cell measuring six feet long, seven feet high,
and three feet wide.' Additionally, he alleges that he was
beaten and tortured into falsely confessing to having trained
with terrorists in Afghanistan, even though he had never been
to Afghanistan.95
The Canadian Embassy contacted the Syrian Government
about Arar on October 20, 2002.96 Almost a year later, on
October 5, 2003, Syria released Arar to Canadian Authorities
without filing any charges.97 The U.S. Government argued (and
the court accepted) that the alleged torture to Arar occurred
while he was in Syrian custody.9" Ultimately, Arar's various
statutory and constitutional claims were dismissed due to lack
of standing, failure to name those defendants personally
involved, and the fact that he never officially entered the United
States." The Canadian government was not so quick to dismiss
Arar's claim, however, forming a Commission capable of
reviewing the secret elements to Arar's claim."°°
3. El-Masri v. United States
El-Masri 1 maintains that his capture and subsequent
torture were pursuant to an unlawful policy and practice known
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 254.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 255.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 255.
98. Id. at 281-83; Williams, supra note 79, at 48.
99. See Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 250.
100. See Arar Commission, supra note 72.
101. El-Masri is a Kuwaiti-born German citizen of ten years. Scott Pelley, CIA
Flying Suspects to Torture?, CBS NEWS, Mar. 6, 2005, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/O4/60minutes/printable678155.shtml.
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as "extraordinary rendition."'' 2  After his initial capture and
subsequent interrogation by Macedonian agents he was turned
over to U.S. agents. 3  El-Masri professed that he was
involuntarily held by the CIA for more than four months in
Afghanistan"° without access to legal representation or the
German embassy."°5 After the case was filed in district court,"°6
the United States intervened as a defendant, claiming that the
case posed an unreasonable risk of disclosing privileged state
secrets. 7 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
102. El-Masri v. United States (El-Masri 11), 479 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, 75 U.S.L.W. 3663, 76 U.S.L.W. 3021 (U.S. Oct. 9, 2007) (No. 06-1613).
The operation described by El-Masri is known as extraordinary rendition, which is
defined by the Fourth Circuit as "the clandestine abduction and detention outside
the United States of persons suspected of involvement in terrorist activities, and
their subsequent interrogation using methods impermissible under U.S. and
international laws." Id.
103. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, El-Masri II, 479 F.3d 296 (No. 06-1613).
On vacation, El-Masri was forcibly detained and interrogated concerning his
suspected ties to Al-Qaeda by Macedonian border agents for three weeks. Id. Upon
his transfer, El-Masri maintains that he was blindfolded, beaten, stripped, and
sodomized with a hard object, after which he was placed in a diaper and hurried on
to a plane where he was shackled spread-eagled. Id. El-Masri goes on to claim that
between the time his blindfold was removed and when he was placed in a diaper, he
saw seven or eight men dressed in black. Id.
104. A hair sample taken from El-Masri verified his claim that he had spent
time in a South Asian country and was deprived of food for a prolonged period of
time. Declaration of Manfred Gnjidic in Support of Plaintiffs Opposition to the
United States' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment at
4, El-Masri v. Tenet (El.Masri 1), 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006) (No.
1:05cv1417-TSE-TRJ), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/gnjidicdecl_
exch.pdf.
105. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, El-Masri II, 479 F.3d 296 (No. 06-1613).
A uniformed German speaker who identified himself as "Sam" refused to say
whether he was sent by the German government, but El-Masri later identified his
voice as a German intelligence officer. Id. at 4-5 n.7. Additionally, El-Masri asserts
that his imprisonment was not terminated even after a U.S. agent informed him of
his innocence. Id. at 4.
106. El-Masri alleged three separate causes of action. The first claim is brought
pursuant to a cause of action recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), for
violations of El-Masri's Fifth Amendment right to due process. El-Masri I, 437 F.
Supp. 2d at 534. El-Masri's second cause of action is brought pursuant to the Alien
Tort Statute (ATS) for violations of international legal norms prohibiting prolonged
arbitrary detention which was codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Id. at 535. El-Masri's
final cause of action is also brought pursuant to the ATS for the violation of
international legal norms prohibiting cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Id.
The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the statute as providing district courts
jurisdiction over civil suits brought by aliens for violations of a limited set of well-
recognized norms of international law, but has yet to identify which well-recognized
norm are actionable. Id. at 535 n.6.
107. El-Masri II, 479 F.3d at 299-300.
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affirmed the district court's finding that the government
properly asserted a valid state secrets privilege.' °8 The Court of
Appeals' holding was implicitly affirmed on October 9, 2007
when the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. 9
To prove his claims against the U.S. Government, El-Masri
would have had to prove that he was abducted, detained, and
subjected to cruel and degrading treatment under the policies of
the United States' extraordinary rendition program."' But,
despite receiving several published reports' detailing both the
existence and modus operandi of the CIA program, the Fourth
Circuit determined that El-Masri did not plead enough facts
"central to litigating his action. '" 2  El-Masri argued that the
district court erroneously found that state secrets were so
integrated into his claim that further litigation would threaten
disclosure of those secrets-especially prior to a responsive
pleading and discovery, which was likely to produce alternative
evidence."'
II. ANALYSIS
"The use of the state secrets privilege.., is the "government's
nuclear option when it comes to litigation. """
108. Id. at 300.
109. U.S. Supreme Court Orders, Oct. 9, 2007, 2, available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/100907pzor.pdf. The Court's
denial means that no four Justices thought that El-Masri's case merited review. See
Huq, Rendition Accountability, supra note 11. The denial also exhausts every
American judicial remedy for El-Masri. Id.
110. Williams, supra note 79, at 49.
111. See generally MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS,
RENDITIONS: CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY LAWS ON TORTURE (Oct. 2007), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32890.pdf; David Ignatius, 'Rendition' Realities,
WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2005, at A21; Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret
History of America's "Extraordinary Rendition" Program, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14,
2005, at 106; Pelley, supra note 101; Observatory on "Rendition" The Use of
European Countries by the CIA for the Transport and Illegal Detention of Prisoners,
STALEWATCH, http://www.statewatch.org/rendition/rendition.html (last visited Feb.
8, 2007).
112. El-MasriII, 479 F.3d at 311.
113. Id. at 302.
114. Bill Conroy, DEA Agent's Whistleblower Case Exposes the "War on Drugs"
as a 'War of Pretense", NARCO NEWS BULL., Sept. 7, 2004, available at
http://www.narconews.comIIssue34article1063.html (quoting Steven Aftergood,
Director, Project on Government Secrecy); see also State Secrets Privilege Gets a
Workout, SECRECY NEWS, Apr. 23, 2002, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/
secrecy/2002/04/042302.html.
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Claims involving the state secrets privilege create tension
between two distinct public interests."' The interest in
preventing public harm that comes from the disclosure of
certain documents is placed in direct tension with the public
interest in preventing the frustration of justice."6  The
tremendous cost imposed by secrecy within an elected
government undermines the legal, political, and cultural
traditions of that government."7
The court's deference is allowing the government to expand
the scope of the state secrets privilege."8 The government has
cultivated the privilege such that its successful invocation is
sufficient to effectively dismiss any claim remotely connected to
a unilaterally determined national secret, thereby eliminating
the possibility of judicial review on the merits of the case."9 By
denying certiorari to El-Masri, the U.S. Supreme Court missed
a prime opportunity to clarify and limit blatant overexpansion of
the privilege. England, faced with a similar expansion of the
crown privilege, limited the government's ability to invoke the
privilege a mere twenty-five years after Duncan by requiring
the judiciary to review the information. 2 ° Specifically the U.S.
Supreme Court ignored two critical areas requiring further
examination: 1) the existing circuit split surrounding the
Reynolds balancing test; and 2) the developing fusion of the
state secrets privilege with the Totten Doctrine. 2 '
If the United States could limit its expanding use of the
state secrets privilege, it would prevent further erosion of
America's relationship with Europe.' As one of the most
influential legal systems in the world, America must return to
the legal and moral high ground by establishing a check on the
executive's power to decide unilaterally what is and is not a
state secret.'23 Clearly establishing a check on the wanton use of
115. Conway v. Rimmer, [1968] 1 All E.R. 874, 880 H.L.(E.). Lord Reid states
that it "is universally recognised that ... there are two kinds of public interests
which may clash." Id.
116. Id.
117. PALLITTO & WEAVER, supra note 6, at 5.
118. Id. at 120.
119. See PALLITo & WEAVER, supra note 6, at 45 (explaining the executive's
expansive ability to classify information as secret is combined with the inherent self-
interest in preventing information from becoming publicly available).
120. Conway, [1968] 1 All.E.R. at 908 (Lord Pearce holding that the court has
always had an inherent power to inspect and order the production of evidence).
121. See supra Part I.A. (discussion of Totten doctrine).
122. Rendition Hearings, supra note 74, at 8.
123. Id.
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the privilege will reaffirm that no one branch of government has
final authority to interpret and apply constitutional powers 2 4
and will influence how other nations handle the necessity of
protecting their own state secrets. Specifically, the United
States could reaffirm its dedication to a free government by
adopting minor changes within the judiciary and legislature to
act as that check on the potential for executive abuse of the
privilege.
A. U.S. CIRCUIT SPLITS IN ADJUDICATING STATE SECRET CLAIMS
'A house divided against itself cannot stand. 2 5
Denying certiorari to El-Masri bypassed an opportunity to
further define the nature and scope of the state secrets
privilege, specifically it leaves two significant U.S. Court of
Appeals circuit splits unresolved. The first split involves the
proper scope and application of the Reynolds balancing test.
The second split concerns the procedural results and
repercussions following the successful invocation of the
privilege.
1. Balancing Test Application
The proper application of the Reynolds balancing test
specifically requires a showing of necessity by the litigant in
order to determine how far the courts should probe into the
appropriateness of the invocation."6 According to Reynolds, if
the party expresses a strong showing of necessity, the claim of
privilege should not be lightly accepted; but if alternative
methods of proving a case make the necessity dubious, the claim
of privilege will likely prevail.'27 The court acknowledges that
124. Gerald Gunther, Judicial Hegemony and Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon
Case and the Impeachment Process, 22 UCLA L. REV. 30, 34 (1974) ("[T]here is
nothing in Marbury . . .that precludes a constitutional interpretation which gives
final authority to another branch.").
125. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Speech at Springfield, June 17, 1858, in POLITICAL
DEBATES BETWEEN ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS IN THE
CELEBRATED CAMPAIGN OF 1858 IN ILLINOIS 2 (1895), available at
http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/MOML?af=RN&ae=FlO2868700&srchtp=a&ste
=14.
126. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953); see Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S.
1, 9 (2005) (reaffirming the appropriateness of the state secrets privilege balancing
test).
127. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11.
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even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the
privilege when the information being sought is a properly
classified state secret.' The privilege is not properly invoked,
however, until the court is satisfied that disclosure of the
underlying documents would be dangerous."9 Thus in its proper
application, the balancing test is used to determine whether the
privilege is properly invoked. 3 ° Once the court determines that
the privilege is properly invoked by the government, it is
absolute. 3 '
The D.C. Circuit applies the Reynolds balancing test not to
determine whether or not the privilege is properly invoked but
instead as an additional inquiry after determining that the
government has successfully invoked the privilege. 3 '
Specifically, the D.C. Circuit asks whether the actual "harm
that might reasonably be seen to flow from disclosure is
adequate . . . to trigger the absolute right to withhold the
information."'33  When applied in this manner, the balancing
test is only utilized to determine whether the court should
examine more than just an affidavit asserting the privilege (and
perhaps an in camera inspection of the underlying document).'34
In this variant of the balancing test, the necessity of the
litigant's need for the document has no weight or role in
upholding or denying the invocation of the privilege.'35 This
effectively creates an additional bar to defeating the privilege
that does not concern the actual merits of the claim.
136
2. Results of Successful Invocation of State Secrets Privilege
A second area of circuit tension involves an inquiry as to
whether the state secrets privilege requires dismissal of an
entire claim if a party might assert issues that implicate state
secrets rather than merely excluding specific evidentiary items
128. Id. at 10-11; see also WIGMORE, supra note 56, § 2379.
129. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9.
130. Id. at 11. ("Where there is a strong showing of necessity, the claim of
privilege should not be lightly accepted" and the necessity for the evidence is
reduced by the availability of alternative evidence.").
131. PALLITrO & WEAVER, supra note 6, at 93.
132. Halkin v. Helms (Halkin I), 690 F.2d 977, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction for military commission decisions for all detainees and enemy
combatants. Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. § 950g (2006).
20081 453
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and allowing the claim to continue. 37 Both the Ninth and the
Fourth Circuits have expanded the scope of the state secrets
privilege so that a claim will likely be dismissed if it potentially
involves privileged evidence.' Contrast this with the D.C.
Circuit, which evaluates whether the claim may be adjudicated
through alternative means, with the use of alternative evidence,
or by "disentangl[ing] the nonsensitive information."' 9
The Fourth Circuit decided its first post-Reynolds state
secrets claim in 1969."4 It has since developed a doctrine where
any successful invocation of the state secrets privilege that bars
specific evidence from discovery such that a prima facie case
cannot be made without that evidence requires dismissal of that
claim. 4' This application extends Reynolds beyond its original
holding that allowed parties to utilize "available alternative...
evidence to make out their case without forcing a showdown"
with the privilege.'42 This is in direct contrast to the intent of
Reynolds, which held that the availability of alternative
evidence is a factor in the balancing test. 43
By quickly dismissing a case, simply because one of the
methods available to a party involves potential state secrets, the
courts are removing a barrier to the application of the privilege
and allowing the government a preemptive strike.'" This shift
changes the privilege from a shield used to protect specific items
of evidence to a sword used to preempt potential claims against
137. Reynolds established the state secrets privilege as an evidentiary privilege
only. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953); see also Tenet v. Doe,
544 U.S. 1, 8-10 (2005).
138. See Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998) (dismissing the
claim despite the plaintiffs ability to produce nonprivileged evidence); see also El-
Masri v. United States (El-Masri I1), 479 F.3d 296, 311 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
75 U.S.L.W. 3663, 76 U.S.L.W. 3021 (U.S. Oct. 9, 2007) (No. 06-1613) (dismissing El-
Masri's claim during the pleading stage despite several published news reports and
physical evidence supporting his claim).
139. Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
140. Heine v. Raus, 305 F. Supp. 816, 821 (4th Cir. 1969) (holding that the
government's invocation of the state secrets doctrine was sufficient to prevent a
defamation suit from proceeding).
141. See El-Masri II, 479 F.3d at 306 (holding that when any attempt to proceed
will threaten the disclosure of a state secret, dismissal is the proper remedy); see also
Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 273 (4th Cir. 1980).
142. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11.
143. Id.
144. The increased use of potential evidence results in the dismissal of the case
during the pleading stage. See El-Masri II, 479 F.3d at 311; see also Huq,
Dangerous Discretion, supra note 9 (explaining that El-Masri was dismissed before
any evidence was presented or El-Masri could show evidence other than what the
government proscribed as secret).
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the government. For example, in Reynolds the privilege was
asserted to prevent the disclosure of evidence after the evidence
was requested-i.e., during the discovery stage.'45  But, while
still in the pleading stage, the government asserted that El-
Masri's claim "seeks to place at issue . . . activity that may
neither be confirmed nor denied," but could not give more
details because "even stating precisely the harm that may result
from further proceedings in this case is contrary to the national
interest."" Modifying the privilege in such a manner, provides
an opportunistic government greater incentive to invoke the
privilege before the merits of the case are clearly established,
thereby preventing discovery of a potentially embarrassing
act.'47 By showing that a method of proving the claim involves
state secrets the government can quash the issue during the
pleading stage of litigation and prevent discovery for that
claim.'48
Alternatively, following the successful invocation of the
state secrets privilege, the D.C. Circuit poses a second inquiry to
determine "whether the case is to proceed as if the privileged
matter had simply never existed . . . or instead should proceed
under rules that have been changed to accommodate the loss of
the otherwise relevant evidence."'49 This application is not only
a more honest interpretation of Reynolds; it also allows the
court to compensate the affected parties in the interest of the
individual's right to a judicial remedy rather than simply
dismissing the case. 5 ° For example the court could alter the
burden of persuasion upon particular issues or utilize
145. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 3.
146. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Motion by
Intervenor United States to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment
at 11-12, El-Masri v. Tenet (El-Masri 1), 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006),
available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/govtmot_dismiss.pdf.
147. See Shayana Kadidal, The State Secrets Privilege and Executive
Misconduct, JURIST, May 30, 2006, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/
2006/05/state-secrets-privilege-and-executive.php (asserting that "[p]revious
invocations of the privilege by the government have most commonly been at the
discovery stage, asking the courts to deny private litigants access to documents or
witnesses, but more recently the government has moved to dismiss a spate of cases.
at the pleading stage").
148. See El-Masri II, 479 F.3d at 311 (dismissing El-Masri's claim because the
government showed that one method of defending the claim would involve state
secrets despite the existence of public reports).
149. Halkin v. Helms (Halkin I), 690 F.2d 977, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
150. Reynolds expressly stated that the availability of alternative evidence
affects the balancing test. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11.
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presumptions or presumptive inferences to obtain lost proofs.'
B. EL-MASRI: CREATING A REYNOLDS-TOTTEN FUSION
"For the rule proposed here, the victim is more likely to be
some individual who is prevented from proving a valid claim--or
(worse still) prevented from establishing a valid defense. The
latter is particularly unpalatable for those who love justice,
because it causes the courts of law not merely to let stand a
wrong, but to become themselves the instruments of wrong."'52
The state secrets privilege is not intended to be a complete
bar on the adjudication of claims by the courts.153 Charts 1 and
2, however, clearly show the government increasingly invoking
the privilege as a motion to dismiss the entire claim rather than
a motion limiting discovery of specific evidence within a claim. 54
151. Halkin 1H, 690 F.2d at 991.
152. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 19 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining
why privileges must be narrowly construed and also the danger in establishing a
new privilege that when validly asserted chooses as its victim an individual who is
prevented from making a valid claim).
153. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (distinguishing the Totten doctrine from
the state secrets privilege by stating that the state secrets privilege does not forever
close the door to a party's claim). When the state secrets privilege is properly
invoked the result is "simply that the evidence is unavailable, as though a witness
had died, and the case will proceed accordingly, with no consequences save those
resulting from the loss of evidence." In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 145 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
154. Chesney, supra note 4, at 1298-99 (charts changed from bar to line graph).
These numbers provide additional evidence that "the administration is now well on
its way to transforming [the state secrets privilege] from a narrow evidentiary
privilege into something that looks like a doctrine of broad government immunity."
Lanman, supra note 9. But cf. Chesney, supra note 4, at 1252-54 (citing reasons
why using published opinions for determining frequency of assertions of the state
secrets privilege is problematic).
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The first American use of the state secrets privilege
occurred in United States v. Burr' and involved an in camera
inspection of a letter from General Wilkinson to President
Jefferson allegedly containing information exculpating the
accused. 5 6 Justice Marshall determined that it was within the
court's power to review the letter and determine if the matter
should be disclosed, noting that "if it be not immediately and
essentially applicable to the point, [it] will, of course, be
suppressed."'5 Although it is often cited that the privilege was
founded on the chief executive's official duties, 8 at its founding
155. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 37-38 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14692d).
156. Id. at 32. The letter was requested as evidence for the defense, but the
prosecution objected to the production because the evidence contained matters which
"ought not be disclosed." Id. at 37.
157. Id. at 37.
158. WIGMORE, supra note 56, § 2371 (noting that under common law it was
clear that the chief executive held the privilege, but it was less clear if the privilege
Chart 1 - Motion to Limit Discovery (1954-2006)
6
4.
3
1
0 -I -
Chart 2 - Motion to Dismiss (1954-2006)
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it was an evidentiary privilege, subject to judicial review.'59
State secrets are distinguished from official information and are
explicitly excluded from the freedom of information laws."6 But
many doubt the court's ability to have a better perspective or
greater knowledge of a given matter than that of the executive
in weighing the risks.'
Based on the government's success in asserting the
privilege and the post-9/11 desire for secrecy, there is a
significant incentive to invoke the privilege as a blanket
protection over every item of potential evidence (documents and
witnesses) concerning the claim.'62  This incentive has the
potential of effectively barring the courthouse doors for those
who have suffered fundamental harms by the government.'63
For example, dismissing El-Masri's claim based on the state
secrets privilege blocks almost every formal channel for
government accountability over the practice of "extraordinary
rendition," and public accountability for any errors occurring
within that program." The net result is that the government
now has the necessary tools "to seize people and hold them
based on evidence that would not and could not permit criminal
prosecution.' 65 It is possible that in some cases, every potential
item of evidence could be individually privileged; though such a
situation is understandably rare. Equally disturbing, courts
have begun to accept the privilege extremely early in the
proceedings-often before the government has answered the
complaint and before receiving requests for discovery that could
lead to alternative methods of proving the claim.'66 The U.S.
extended to subordinate executive officials).
159. Id. § 2379 ("In the United States ... the court determines the claim."). A
court abdicating the "inherent function of determining the facts upon which the
admissibility of evidence depends will furnish the bureaucratic officials too ample
opportunities for abusing the privilege." Id.
160. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A) (as
amended 2002), exempts items "specifically authorized under criteria established by
an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign
policy." FOIA Section 552(b)(7) also exempts information compiled for law
enforcement purposes but leaves several "outs" where the police are required to
provide the information or forfeit the case.
161. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 8, § 5:54.
162. See PALLITTO & WEAVER, supra note 6, at 117.
163. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 274 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that
the harms inflicted upon Arar clearly meet the "shocks the consciousness" test of the
Due Process Clause).
164. Huq, Rendition Accountability, supra note 11.
165. Id.
166. See Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998) (dismissing the
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Government has mastered the formal procedures required to
invoke the privilege, but has been increasingly ignoring the "not
to be lightly invoked" mandate. 67
As recently as February 10, 2000, the executive has
acknowledged the judiciary as the proper branch to determine
admissibility of evidence.'68 Despite this very specific charge,
the courts have been hesitant to inspect material or check
executive claims where there is potentially a high risk of
disclosure.'69 Of course, the judiciary is not currently in a
position to determine the level of security required for particular
information without review; this entices the executive to claim
that a risk of unintentional disclosure is high with judicial
review.17 This shift has moved what was once a purely
evidentiary privilege to one that parallels the Totten Doctrine
and essentially bars the whole claim at the pleading stage
rather than specific evidence. 7'
The Totten claim is different in its scope from that of other
claims involving the state secrets privilege.'72 Totten voluntarily
entered into a contract with President Lincoln to provide
claim despite the plaintiffs ability to produce nonprivileged evidence); see also El-
Masri v. United States (El-Masri 11), 479 F.3d 296, 313 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
75 U.S.L.W. 3663, 76 U.S.L.W. 3021 (U.S. Oct. 9, 2007) (No. 06-1613) (dismissing El-
Masri's claim during the pleading stage despite several published news reports and
physical evidence supporting his claim).
167. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953).
168. Louis FISHER, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY
WHISTLEBLOWERS 36 (2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/
RL33215.pdf. CIA Director Tenet signed a declaration and formal claim of state
secrets privilege stating that it would not be possible to redact or sanitize the
evidence in any meaningful way. This declaration did not automatically block access
to the evidence; rather it acknowledged that "it is the Court's decision rather than
mine to determine whether the requested material is relevant[.]" FISHER, supra, at
36 (quoting Declaration and Formal Claim of State Secrets Privilege and Statutory
Privilege by George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence at 9, Barlow v. United
States, No. 98-887X (Fed. Cl. Feb. 10, 2000), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/j ud/statesec/barlow-tenet.pdf).
169. See PALLITTO & WEAVER, supra note 6, at 107.
170. Despite the power of the state secrets privilege, there are no policies or
guidelines concerning the proper use of the privilege within the executive. Id. at
119. A Department of the Navy memorandum espouses that "there is nothing but
good news about the state secrets privilege" when used to prevent the disclosure of
information. Id. (quoting MEMORANDUM FROM THE DEP'T OF THE NAVY, OFFICE OF
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN., ASSERTING THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE IN UNITED
STATES CLAIMS COURT AND BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS CASES (1992)).
171. See Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1941 (2007).
172. See Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 3 (2005); see also Frost, supra note 171, at
1941.
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espionage services."' By its very nature the services contracted
for were secret and the parties knew or should have known that
the "lips of the other were to be for ever [sic] sealed respecting
the relation of either to the matter."' 74  Because Totten
voluntarily entered into a secret agreement, he breached the
contract by bringing the very claim for which he sought relief,
thus defeating his chances of recovery.'75 Tenet v. Doe recently
held that the Totten doctrine applies only to a claim based on
covert agreements to engage in espionage for the United
States. 176
The government raised both the state secrets claim and the
Totten doctrine as intervenors against El-Masri' 77 Unlike
Totten, El-Masri was not voluntarily detained by the CIA nor
did he voluntarily subject himself to the secret proceedings.'
Because U.S. District Judge T.S. Ellis ruled in favor of the
government's state secrets claim he did not rule whether or not
the Totten doctrine applied to extraordinary rendition claims.'
79
Judge Ellis' failure to clarify the differences and distinctions
between the state secrets privilege endangers the blurring of the
two distinct privileges.' Judge Ellis wrote that even though
the government was successful in its state secrets claim, thus
making the Totten claim nonjusticiable, Totten claims apply
whenever a party's "success depends upon the existence of [a]
secret espionage relationship with the government."''
C. GLOBAL REACTION AND THE EAST EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN
MODELS
"The protection [of national security-related information]
must be limited in scope, reasonable, and balanced with the need
173. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 105-06 (1875).
174. Id. at 106.
175. Id.
176. See Tenet, 544 U.S. at 3.
177. El-Masri v. Tenet (EI.Masri 1), 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 540 (E.D. Va. 2006).
178. El-Masri v. United States (El-Masri fl), 479 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, 75 U.S.L.W. 3663, 76 U.S.L.W. 3021 (U.S. Oct. 9, 2007) (No. 06-1613).
179. El-Masri I, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 540.
180. Judge Ellis blurs the distinction between the two privileges and threatens
to expand the Totten doctrine by holding that "[i]t is true that El-Masri's allegations
here concern the existence of several 'secret espionage relationships' between the
United States and both certain foreign governments and the corporate defendants."
Id.
181. Id. (quoting Tenet, 544 U.S. at 7).
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for public access to information to ensure a free and democratic
society. ""'2
1. Global Reaction to United States' Validation of Extraordinary
Rendition
The relationship of the United States and Europe, long
considered one of the strongest in the world, has been declining
steadily.'83 The United States has begun a shift from a society
where information is distributed on the basis of a "right to
know" to one where information is distributed on the basis of a
"need to know."'" A recent study found that citizens of Great
Britain, Spain, and France believe the U.S.-led war in Iraq is a
greater threat to world peace than Iran and its reported nuclear
program."5 The people of Europe believe that there is a gap
between America's stated policies and actions.8 6  The
extraordinary rendition allegation, specifically sending suspects
to Syria, is one of the strongest elements undermining the
United State's moral authority in Europe.'7 Expanding the
state secrets privilege beyond its evidentiary roots to effectively
prevent a valid recourse for those who are captured unlawfully
or inadvertently will only further undermine international
relations. 8 As the U.S. Supreme Court has held "international
182. DAVID BANISAR, COMMENTS ON THE CROATIAN DRAFr BILL ON DATA
SECRECY 1 (2007), available at http://www.privacyinternational.org/countries/
Croatia/pi-osce-croatia-07-eng.pdf.
183. Rendition Hearings, supra note 74, at 8 (statement of Julianne Smith,
Director and Senior Fellow, Europe Program, Center for Strategic and International
Studies).
184. GUP, supra note 13, at 9.
185. PEW GLOBAL ATTITUDES PROJECT, AMERICA'S IMAGE SLIPS, BUT ALLIES
SHARE U.S. CONCERNS OVER IRAN, HAMAS 3 (2006) [hereinafter Global Attitudes],
available at http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportlD=252; see also U.S.
'Biggest Global Peace Threat, B.B.C. NEWS, June 14, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/5077984.stm.
186. Rendition Hearings, supra note 74, at 8 (statement of Julianne Smith,
Director and Senior Fellow, Europe Program, Center for Strategic and International
Studies).
187. Id. at 8-10. Fourteen countries have now admitted to allowing the CIA to
operate secret prisons or carry out rendition operations within their territories. Id.
188. The ability of other countries to stand shoulder to shoulder with the United
States without committing political suicide in their home country is important not
only for a successful international anti-terrorism front but also for solving other
global issues. The political elite in other countries will distance themselves from the
United States if they feel that cooperation will be a political liability. See generally
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law is founded upon mutuality and reciprocity."'' 89
According to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights the right to adjudicate wrongs through the court
is a fundamental right.' Often the European Court of Human
Rights views the state secrets privilege as interfering with this
right and requires an in camera inspection of the evidence in
question when the formal elements of the privilege are
satisfied.'9 ' The European Court of Human Rights implied that
the state secrets privilege could be successfully challenged in
the international court if challenges against the privilege were
unsuccessful under domestic law and another domestic remedy
does not exist.' 92
On April 19, 2007 the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe (PACE) adopted a resolution (Resolution
1551) on espionage and divulging state secrets.'93 PACE made it
clear that the need to protect sensitive national information is
important to any government, but poorly defined or overly broad
authorizations allowing the executive to define what constitutes
a "secret" undermine government openness." PACE also
specifically mentioned the United States among the countries
who have recently threatened freedom of information. 95
Resolution 1551 calls on judicial authorities of all countries
to find the appropriate balance between protecting state secrets
and society's interest in exposing government wrongs.9 6 PACE
reinforces "the importance of freedom of expression and of
189. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 259 (1895).
190. The United States became a signatory to the ICCPR on September 8, 1992,
but did so with several Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations (RUD). S.
REP. NO. 23, at 1 (1992), as reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645 [hereinafter, ICCPR Senate
Report].
191. See Matyjek v. Poland, [2007] ECHR 38184/03, Apr. 24, 2007, 20.
192. Id. 1 64.
193. Resolution on Fair Trial Issues in Criminal Cases Concerning Espionage or
Divulging State Secrets, EUR. PARL. DOC. 1551 (2007) [hereinafter Resolution 1551],
available at http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?hink=/Documents/AdoptedText/taO7/
ERES1551.htm.
194. For example, the failure to define state secrets in Tajikistan has resulted in
information concerning the death penalty and economic growth being classified a
state secret. PRIVACY INT'L, LEGAL PROTECTIONS AND BARRIERS ON THE RIGHT TO
INFORMATION, STATE SECRETS AND PROTECTION OF SOURCES IN OSCEP
PARTICIPATING STATES 16 (2007), available at http://www.privacyinternational.org/
foilosce-access-analysis.pdf. In Turkmenistan cases of the plague have been defined
as a state secret. Id. In the United States the executive and his officials have
almost unlimited power to classify material. PALLITTO & WEAVER, supra note 6, at
45.
195. Resolution 1551, supra note 193, 8.
196. Id. 9.
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information in a democratic society, in which it must be possible
to freely expose corruption, human rights violations,
environmental destruction and other abuses of authority.' 97 In
the words of Patrick Henry "[t]o cover with the veil of secrecy
the common routine of business, is an abomination in the eyes of
every intelligent man and every friend to his country."' 98
Once information is classified, there is virtually no
incentive for the government to declassify that information. In
fact, when an individual risks his or her career by improperly
disseminating information, the safest path is to classify even
ordinary information at the highest level possible." Excessive
secrecy lends credibility to conspiracy theorists and may be used
by terrorist organizations to drive a wedge between allies, or
used to cover up illegal acts or simple negligence. Finally,
excessive secrecy may lead to a weakening of more important
information, general disregard of procedural systems, and and
more common leaks. °°
2. Canada and the State Secrets Privilege
The Canadian Supreme Court has often stated that the
exclusion of specific evidence is justified on the ground of state
secrets when there is a greater public interest in excluding the
evidence than in its admission.2"' This determination is made by
the Canadian Federal Court pursuant to Section 38 of the
Canadian Evidence Act in cases of national defense or
security.22 Even when a state secrets objection is properly put
forward, the Canadian courts may order disclosure.2 3 Prior to
197. Id. 2.
198. PALLITTO & WEAVER, supra note 6, at 84 (quoting Patrick Henry).
199. Id. at 48.
200. GUP, supra note 13, at 10 (finding that people have become desensitized by
the increased number of classified documents and the recognition that many are
undeserving of the designation). U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart stated
that "when everything is classified then nothing is classified, and the system
becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be manipulated
by those intent on self-protection or self-promotion." New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring); see also Arar Commission,
supra note 72, at 9 (finding that the information given to the media concerning Arar
came from government leaks with access to classified information).
201. R. v. Guenke, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 263, 283 (Can.).
202. FED. PROSECUTION SERV., DEP'T OF JUSTICE CAN., THE FEDERAL
PROSECUTION SERVICE DESKBOOK § 37.4.2 (2000), available at
http://www.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/fps/fpd/ch37.html.
203. Canada Evidence Act § 38.06; FED. PROSECUTION SERV., supra note 202, §
37.5.
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ordering disclosure, the court will investigate the extent of the
potential harm caused by the disclosure and attempt to
minimize that harm.2° In extreme cases where the harm cannot
be mitigated, the court may stay the proceedings."'
In January 2004, an Ottawa Citizen reporter was
threatened with prosecution under the Security of Information
Act and her office was searched after she published an article
concerning the transfer of Arar to Syria."° Certain information
in the article was considered state secret and she was
investigated for alleged offenses under Section 4 of the Security
of Information Act covering leaks of secret government
information °.2 7 The Ontario Court of Justice ruled in 2006 that
the Act violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. 2 °
Following O'Neil, the Canadian Government 2' appointed a
commission to make a factual inquiry into the "actions of
Canadian officials in relation to Maher Arar" for national
security confidentiality concerns.20 The Arar Commission
determined that they had a duty to be independent and
impartial to satisfy the public's desire for the truth."' In
addition to impartiality, the Arar Commission found that in
order to realize their duty of independence and impartiality,
they had to be thorough and examine all relevant issues.2
Although the Arar Commission was a public inquiry, the
commissioner was allowed to balance the interests of the public
with the need to protect national security confidentiality
information.2"3  He did this through in camera review of all
available information related to Arar's disappearance, including
204. FED. PROSECUTION SERV., supra note 202, § 37.5.
205. Id.
206. O'Neill v. Canada (Attorney General), [2006 272 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (Can.).
207. Id. 4.
208. Id. 65, 79-82 (finding the Security of Information Act overly broad and
overly vague to such an extent that it violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms).
209. The Arar Commission acted pursuant to Order of Council P.C. 2004-0048 of
February 5, 2004, available at http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/oic-ddc/OIC-DDC.asp?lang
=EN&txtOICID=&txtFromDate=&txtToDate=&txtPrecis=Arar&txtDepartment=&c
boDepartment=&txtAct=&txtChapterNo=&txtChapterYear=&txtBillNo=&rdoComi
ngIntoForce=&DoSearch=Search+%2F+List&OICKey=677 10&viewattach=15494.
210. Arar Commission, supra note 72, at 280. The Commission was headed by
former Canadian Supreme Court Justice Dennis O'Conner. Huq, Rendition
Accountability, supra note 11.
211. Arar Commission, supra note 72, at 282.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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classified material.1 4
During this independent review the Arar Commission found
that there was a good deal of information that could be disclosed
without harm to national security.1 5  Examples include
information that is rightly classified but has already come into
the public domain, and information that, though secret, may be
disclosed if the public interest in disclosure outweighs the
potential injury. 26
Based on the Arar Commission's precedent and
recommendations, the Canadian Government has relaxed its
national security confidentiality claims to a "significant
degree."2 '7  The Commission specifically determined that the
prospect of litigating questionable claims concerning secrets is
in no one's interest and the government's temptation to utilize
the state secrets shield to prevent embarrassing or criminal
activity from public scrutiny should always be avoided. 28 The
process employed by the Arar Commission is an example of how
separation of powers provides a check to the executive's ability
to invoke the state secrets privilege, thereby ensuring public
accountability for an overreaching government.2"9
3. Eastern Europe and the State Secrets Privilege
Those who have been historically prevented from access to
information tend to be more aware of the ability of an individual
to gain that access. 22' The Constitutional Court of the Republic
of Hungary holds that "[flreedom of information, the openness of
214. Id. at 10-11.
215. Id. at 284.
216. Id. This is also congruent with PACE's determination that information
already in the public domain cannot be considered a state secret. Resolution 1551,
supra note 193, 10.1.
217. Arar Commission, supra note 72, at 302.
218. See id.
219. Id. at 304.
220. See Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] arts.
29.4, 29.5 (protecting the individual's right to access information and the protection
of the media through federal law); see also Federal'nyi Zakon [FZ RF] [Law of the
Russian Federation on Mass Media] art. 38.2, available at http://www.medialaw.ru
e-pages/laws/russianmassmedia -eng/massmedia eng.html (requiring state officials
to inform the media about their activities to ensure transparency in governance); id.
art. 40.2 (restricting refusals to provide information be clearly communicated and
restricted to those cases of state, commercial or other law-protected secrets). But cf.
Hedwig de Smaele, Mass Media and the Information Climate in Russia, 59 EUROPE-
ASIA STUD. 1299, 1301 n.8 (2007) (finding that despite the law information
restriction is still de facto common practice).
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exercising public power, transparency and control of the
activities of the state and executive power are prerequisites for
the right to criticize, the freedom of criticism, the freedom of
expression."22'  The Court then held the freedom to access
information is a fundamental right that enjoys at least as much
constitutional protection as its "mother" right, the freedom of
expression.222 The open, transparent, and accountable activity of
the public combined with the public operation of the executive
power is a fundamental requirement of democracy.2 Without
the public's ability to access the government's inner workings
the state would become an "alienated mechanism." '224 The Court
claimed that in its alienation the state would become
incalculable and expressly dangerous, since the non-
transparency of the operations of the state poses an increased
danger to constitutional liberties. 25
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) has developed model bills on freedom of information,
information protection, state secrets, and access to
environmental information, and it evaluates currently existing
information accessibility.226  Estonia's States Secrets Act
specifically defines each type of information that may be
classified, the different categories of state secret classification,"2
and the length of time each category may remain classified.22
Additionally, the legislation allows the court to access privileged
information when required "to perform duties which have been
assigned to them by the Constitution or Acts of the Republic of
Estonia[J" 229 This type of legislation establishes clearly defined
legislative and judicial checks on the executive's power to
declare information privileged and prevent the disclosure of
221. HUNG. HELSINKI COMM., HUNGARY FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ACCESS
TO INFORMATION 26 (2001), available at http://www.helsinki.hudocs/
expression0I0607.pdf (quoting the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Hungary,
Decision No. 60/1994 (XII. 24)).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. PRIVACY INT'L, supra note 194, at 12-21, 34.
227. Estonia State Secrets Act, RT I, 1999, § 3, available at
http://www.era.int/domains/corpus.juris/public-pdf/estonia-state-secrets-act.pdf
(establishing three categories of classification: confidential, secret, and top secret).
228. Id. § 3.
229. Id. § 171, subdiv. 1. Section 171 was added by Section 36. Id. § 36
(Amendment of Code of Criminal Procedure).
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duly classified material.23 °
Another example of Eastern European legislative and
judicial control of state secrets is embodied in Romanian Law
no. 182."' Romanian law limits who may declare information a
state secret,232 allows individuals a judicial redress for disputes
of information classification,23 3 and prohibits activating the
privilege "for the purpose of hiding law infringements,
administrative errors, limitation of access to information of
public interest, illegal restriction of exercising the rights of any
person or harming other legitimate interests."'234 Also, Romania
prohibits the classification of basic scientific information with no
connection to national security.235
Some OSCE countries impose time limits on their secrets,
while others require that the information remain classified only
as long as necessary to protect the interests involved.236
Macedonia's Law on Classified Information limits state secrets
to ten years, highly confidential information to five years,
confidential information to three years, and internal
information to two years.237 Albania, like the United States,
limits secret classifications to ten years, but unlike Albania, the
United States can extend the limit if it can be shown that it
needs a longer duration.23 Time limitations are not useful to
individuals who are unable to bring their claim unless the
statute of limitations on their claim is sufficiently long to outlast
the privilege and there exists some independent review process
prior to the classification of the contested information being
extended.239
230. See Resolution 1551, supra note 193, 9.
231. Romanian Law no. 182 of Apr. 12, 2002 on the protection of classified
information, available at http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/
epublishdocs/FreedomOflnformation Legislation/RomaniaLawl82.pdf.
232. Id. ch. II, art. 19.
233. Id. art. 20.
234. Id. art. 24, § 5.
235. Id. § 6.
236. PRIVACY INT'L, supra note 194, at 17.
237. Id. at 17-18.
238. Id. at 18. This is not an independent review as it is conducted under the
direction of the Archivist, acting in consultation with the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs. See Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196 (2003),
reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 435 (West 2008).
239. See generally Gregor Peter Schmitz, US Supreme Court Rejects El-Masri
Case, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT'L, Oct. 10, 2007, http://www.spiegel.de/international/
world/0, 1518,510523,00.html.
20081
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
D. PROPOSED CHANGES
"The great privilege of the Americans does not consist in
being more enlightened than other nations, but in being able to
repair the faults they may commit."240
The continued expansion of the state secrets privilege from
a mere evidentiary privilege to an executive privilege that
serves to unilaterally dismiss claims not only violates the
individual right to redress a wrong, but also sets an example for
the rest of the world that democracy does not equal individual
rights.24" ' Although it is important to understand the role of the
executive in assuring the security of the nation, the courts and
legislature need to recognize that secret evidence is harmful to
the proper adjudication of legitimate legal claims.242 Returning
the state secrets privilege back to its evidentiary roots may be
accomplished by several different methods that protect both the
government interest in securing privacy and the individual
liberty interests in adjudicating a valid claim for government
misconduct. Such methods are often varied according to the
given set of circumstances but would always contain a
combination of in camera inspection/adjudication, legislative
boundaries for the privilege, and independent legislative review
committees.
1. Judicial Review
The courts could present the government with the option of
either surrendering the requested document for an in camera
inspection by the judge or losing the case.243 This option would
apply to all civil litigation whether the government is a plaintiff
240. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 317 (Francis Bowen
ed., Henry Reeve trans., 1862), available at http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/
MOML?af=RN&ae=F3702400701&srchtp=a&ste=14.
241. For example, Croatia in redefining its state secrets privilege broadened
their definition to include information not traditionally considered a state secret and
with no distinct boundaries between state secrets and non-state secrets. BANISAR,
supra note 182, at 2.
242. Ellen C. Yaroshefsky, The Slow Erosion of the Adversary System: Article III
Courts, FISA, CIPA and Ethical Dilemmas, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J.
203, 232 (2006).
243. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, REFORMING THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE 12
(2007), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Reforming-the-State_
Secrets PrivilegeStatement2.pdf; see also Yaroshefsky, supra note 242, at 229-30
(finding that there should be a presumption that a party with the appropriate
security clearances should have access to the evidence).
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or a defendant, as in El-Masri. The in camera inspection would
still rely upon the balancing test outlined in Reynolds but would
apply that test solely to the admission of that specific evidence
and not to determining the validity of the claim or the admission
of potential evidence.2"
In criminal cases the defendant has a right to access
documents needed to establish innocence.245 It is improper for
the judiciary to allow suppression of documents that might tend
to exculpate.246  When the government "institutes criminal
proceedings in which evidence, otherwise privileged under a
statute or regulation, becomes importantly relevant, it abandons
the privilege." '247 If the government refuses to produce the
required documents, the court may dismiss the case.248
This option would allow an independent judiciary to
determine the merits of the privilege and not the party claiming
the privilege.249 Such a system would also place a critical
decision in the hands of a judge who may not have the
knowledge, or skills to determine the appropriate classification
of the evidence presented."' If the judiciary lacks such requisite
knowledge they may appoint nonparties with expertise to assist
in assessing the risks of disclosure.25" ' Ultimately the judiciary
must "find an appropriate balance between the state interest in
preserving official secrecy on the one hand . . . and society's
interest in exposing abuses of power on the other hand."'252
2. Legislative Oversight and Review
The legislature has limited capacities for oversight and
244. See generally Conway v. Rimmer, [1968] 1 All E.R. 874 (H.L.) (U.K.).
245. See generally United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No.
14692d).
246. Id.
247. United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580, 584 (2d Cir. 1946).
248. NLRB v. Capitol Fish Co., 294 F.2d 868, 875 (5th Cir. 1961). The
government "cannot hide behind a self-erected wall [of] evidence adverse to its
interest as a litigant." Id.
249. See Arar Commission, supra note 72, at 282 (requiring that the inquiry be
independent to satisfy the public desire for the truth).
250. See United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d, 1309, 1318 (4th Cir. 1972)
(determining that courts are too ill-equipped to become steeped in covert and foreign
intelligence matters to effectively review and establish proper secrecy classification
where improper disclosure could result in harm to the government). A private in the
U.S. Army with a security clearance is considered more trustworthy to handle
classified information than a judge. PALLITTO & WEAVER, supra note 6, at 103.
251. Chesney, supra note 4, at 1311.
252. Resolution 1551, supra note 193, 9.
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often transfers this responsibility to the judiciary."3  Such
limited capability includes legislative control over the judiciary's
jurisdiction to oversee specific claims and indirectly affect
government programs through funding.2" For example, the
Lithuanian Constitutional Court's guarantee of public access255
did not reach certain state secrets.256 It was up to the legislature
to determine the categories of information that the executive
could withhold.257 This is similar to a recent Canadian proposal
to establish an independent review board for national security
activities.25
Although legislative oversight may not have allowed El-
Masri to continue his immediate claim, it would provide a
separate check on the executive's power. 9  U.S. scholars
recommended that Congress create a code for the judiciary to
follow in cases involving the state secrets privilege when the
Federal Rules of Evidence were passed in 1975.2" Congress
declined to implement legislative limits to the privilege,
preferring instead to allow the judiciary to determine the limits
via case law.26 '
Many other nations have created similar independent
legislative checks and restrictions upon the state secrets
privilege to ensure that the privilege is available to protect
actual secrets and limit the potential for abuse.262 PACE, in
253. PALLITTO & WEAVER, supra note 6, at 106-07.
254. Frost, supra note 171, at 1952-53.
255. See Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucija [Constitution] art. 25, para. 5 (Lith.)
(granting citizens the right to "available information which concerns them").
256. See Constitutional Court of Lithuania, Case 3/96, §§ 1.2, 1.4 (Dec. 19, 1996),
available at http:/www.lrkt.lt/dokumentai/1996/n6a1219a.htm. See generally Nida
Gelazis, Defending Order and Freedom: The Lithuanian Constitutional Court in Its
First Decade, in CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE, EAST AND WEST: DEMOCRATIC
LEGITIMACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE IN A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 395 (Wojciech Sadurski ed., 2002).
257. Law on State Secrets and Official Secrets, No. VIII-1443, arts. 4-5 (Lith.),
available at http://www3.lrs.lt/cgi-bin/getfmt?cl=w&c2=157736 (defining the scope of
state secrets).
258. Arar Commission, supra note 72, at 277.
259. See Frost, supra note 171, at 1953.
260. See CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 243, at 8-9.
261. Id.
262. Conway reversed the United Kingdom's interpretation that the state
secrets privilege is absolute as described by Duncan. Conway v. Rimmer, [1968] 1
All E.R. 874 (H.L.) (U.K.); cf. Constitutional Court of Czech Republic, Case No. P1.
US 11/2000 (July 12, 2001) (as summarized in http://codices.coe.int, indexed as CZE-
2001-2-012) (striking down portions of the Protection of Classified Information Act
involving administrative discretion concerning access to secret information via
security clearance absent of independent of judicial review); Military Secret Leakage
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recognizing the importance of trials concerning state secrets,
has outlined several principles for the judiciary to follow.263
These legislative restrictions are vital to ensuring a fair trial for
all involved.2" Ultimately PACE recognized that the "freedom of
expression and information are fundamental components of a
democratic society. 265
3. Pseudonyms
Yet another option would be to assign pseudonyms to
individuals in cases where identities need to be kept secret.266
Unfortunately, in extreme cases where the government is the
defendant or the issue involves a government action, this is not
a viable option."7
III. CONCLUSION
"'[There are more instances of the abridgement of the
freedom of the people, by gradual and silent encroachments of
those in power, than by violent and sudden usurpations[.]"2 6
case, 4 KCCR 64, 89Hun-Ka104 (Feb. 25, 1992) (S. Korea) (holding that even though
the protecting of military secrets is of great importance the scope of military secrets
should not be so broad as to reduce the people's right to know) (as described in
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF S. KOREA, THE FIRST TEN YEARS OF THE KOREAN
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (2001), available at http://www.ccourt.go.kr/home/english/
decision_etc/decision l0year.htm).
263. Resolution 1551, supra note 193, 10.
264. Id.
265. Eur. Parl. Ass., Recommendation on Fair Trial Issues in Criminal Cases
Concerning Espionage or Divulging State Secrets, DOC. NO. 11457 (2007), available
at http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/workingdocs/doc07/
edocl1457.htm; see also Constitutional Court of the Republic of Hungary, Decision
No. 60/1994 (XII.22) AB (points 1 & 5), reprinted in 2 E. Euro. Case Rptr. of Const.
L. 159, 169 (1995).
266. See Tilden v. Tenet, 140 F. Supp. 2d 623, 624 (E.D. Va. 2000). A female
covert CIA employee was assigned a pseudonym to protect her identity in a claim of
sex discrimination against Tenet. Id. at 624 n. 1. The case was dismissed after the
government successfully invoked the state secrets privilege which the court treated
as a motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. Id. at 626. The court
held that it was not its place to second guess the proper invocation of the privilege,
and the only question to consider was whether the case could proceed at all. Id.
267. See El-Masri v. United States (El-Masri I1), 479 F.3d 296, 299-300 (4th Cir.
2007), cert. denied, 75 U.S.L.W. 3663, 76 U.S.L.W. 3021 (U.S. Oct. 9, 2007) (No. 06-
1613).
268. 5 JAMES MADISON, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 126 (Gaillard Hunt
ed., 1904), available at http:/fbooks.google.combooks?id=sGGGs3reveOC.
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It is imperative that the U.S. Supreme Court re-evaluate
the shifting balance struck by increased application of the state
secrets privilege during the pleading stage and return this
doctrine to its common law foundation as an evidentiary rule.
Additional judicial clarification and legislative definition of the
state secrets privilege is required to return to the proper balance
between the need for an individual redress for wrongs and the
protection of valid national secrets.
The state secret privilege has often been described as
"rarely invoked," but recent history belies this claim.269 During
the four years following September 11, 2001, the U.S.
Government has successfully claimed the state secrets privilege
twenty-three separate times. 70 Additionally, it is unknown how
many times the claim has been invoked or threatened to deter
an otherwise valid claim from being filed.27" ' It has become
increasingly clear, however, that recent cases show the
government is using the privilege with greater abandon and
with little danger of reprisal.272 The increased use of the
privilege is significant because a successful invocation of the
state secrets privilege is rarely defeated.273 A search of legal
databases turn up just one case where the court refused to
269. See Dana Priest, Secrecy Privilege Invoked in Fighting Ex-Detainee's
Lawsuit, WASH. POST, May 13, 2006, at A3 (reporting that between 1954 and 2001
the privilege was asserted fifty-five times). The state secrets privilege has been
invoked more times during President George W. Bush's tenure than during any
other presidency. PALLIrrO & WEAVER, supra note 6, at 117.
270. Priest, supra note 269, at A03.
271. It is inherently difficult to accurately capture qualitative data concerning
the assertion of the state secrets privilege. Chesney, supra note 4, at 1301.
However, it is clear that the government threatens to use the privilege without
following the formal requirements of Reynolds. Stillman v. Dep't of Defense, 209 F.
Supp. 2d 185, 222-23 (D.D.C. 2002).
272. The government recently invoked the privilege 245 times in a single case
without meeting the formal criteria required by Reynolds. PALLITTO & WEAVER,
supra note 6, at 117. The government also raised the claim to prevent adjudication
of alleged violations of privacy-specifically the release of banking records--for a
program that was once secret, but has since been disclosed. Dan Bilefsky, Belgians
Say Banking Group Broke European Rules in Giving Data to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
29, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/29/world/europe/29swift.
html.
273. Andrew Zajac, Bush Wielding Secrecy Privilege to End Suits: National
Security Cited Against Challenges to Anti-Terror Tactics, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 3, 2005, at
1 (stating that the privilege "has been stymied only five times"). However, it is
difficult to determine if this number is accurate as the government often re-invokes
the privilege during the appeal. See Halkin v. Helms (Halkin 1), 598 F.2d 1, 11 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (overturning the lower court's rejection of the privilege).
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accept the government's asserted privilege.274
To allow the executive branch to continue to expand the
scope of the state secrets privilege would not only allow the
government's self-serving assertions to usurp the authority of
the court,275 but would also further remove the United States
from its already eroding legal and moral high ground.26  The
United States cannot let another fifty years pass while its
executive branch is so brazenly utilizing the privilege to prevent
disclosure of illegal or potentially embarrassing actions. 277  By
declining to grant certiorari to El-Masri the U.S. Supreme Court
failed to set a proper limit on the application of the state secrets
privilege. Without a judicial or legislative check on the
privilege, the U.S. Government will continue to intentionally
harm individuals while denying them a right to redress wrongs
or challenge government overreaching. As a result, America's
standing in the global community will continue to deteriorate.278
When the government raises the state secrets privilege, the
judiciary must have the ability to ask if the claim is meant not
to keep information from the nation's enemies, but to keep it
from the hands of its citizens.279  Otherwise, suspects will
continue to be extradited under claims shrouded in secrecy with
274. The Clinton administration detained a Palestinian in an immigration
proceeding for nineteen months based on hearsay evidence. Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71
F. Supp. 2d 402, 419 (D.N.J. 1999). The government claimed that he was a threat to
national security and a member of a terrorist organization. Id. At no point was he
provided any details of the alleged threats or of the associations and relationships he
supposedly had with terrorist organizations. Id. The trial court ruled in his favor,
and on appeal, the court ruled that the reliance on secret evidence violated his due
process rights because it deprived him of meaningful notice and an opportunity to
confront the evidence against him, and exclusively hearsay evidence could not be
tested for reliability. Id.
275. See Fisher, supra note 57.
276. Barring the doors to a legitimate forum for those who have a genuine claim
against the U.S. Government fuels the fire of foreign enemies who claim that the
United States is not a true democracy and increases cries that the United States
abuses individual rights. See Global Attitudes, supra note 185.
277. In Reynolds v. United States, the seminal state secrets privilege case, the
documents which the government contained state secrets did not in fact contain
state secrets. After their declassification the documents were reviewed and were
found to contain no obviously sensitive material and show that the cause of the
accident was due to a failure of the Air Force to complete necessary modification in
the airframe. Hampton Stephens, Supreme Court Filing Claims Air Force,
Government Fraud in 1953 Case, INSIDE THE AIR FORCE, Mar. 14, 2003, available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2003/03/iafO31403.html.
278. See Global Attitudes, supra note 185.
279. GUP, supra note 13, at 50.
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no recourse to challenge government missteps and mistakes.2"'
"[Tihe Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty..
It enjoins upon its branches separateness but
interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity."28' The state secrets
privilege must be returned to its evidentiary privilege282 roots
such that either the judiciary or legislature acts as a check on
the executives power to classify information as secret, lest the
U.S. Constitution become a mere "parchment barrier."'283
280. See generally Ahmad v. United States, [2006] EWHC 2927 (Admin.), 2006
WL 3427663 (U.K.). The Queen's Bench held that when determining whether or not
to extradite suspects to the United States determined that there was no proof of
extraordinary renditions by the U.S. Government leading to torture. Id.
281. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
282. Justice Vinson recognized that the privilege was integrated into the
production of evidence, writing that "[j]udicial control over the evidence in a case
cannot be abdicated to the caprice of the executive officers." United States v.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1953).
283. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison). Knowing that power is of an
encroaching nature, Madison warned that without limitations on each branch of
government's exercise of that power, the U.S. Constitution would become a mere
"parchment barrier" to tyranny. Id. Later Madison explained how the rights
granted in the U.S. Constitution gave each branch the means for "keeping each
other in their proper places" through a system of checks and balances. THE
FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
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